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For instance, in Chapter II (two, not eleven), Boole writes: "It is clear also, that to the above class we must refer any sign which may conventionally be used to express some circumstance or relation, the detailed exposition of which would involve the use of any sign." This is analogous to Rand's statements in ITOE that a concept may refer to _any_ existents but must refer to _some_ existent.
In Chapter III, Boole presages Rand on the relationship between concepts and numbers. Also in Chapter III, Boole addresses the problems in correlating mathematical statements to conceptual definitions. Rand says that concepts are mathematical statements.
That's often how theories start: as notions.
Don't be so hypersensitive. It's immature of you.
If Rand is wrong in her _notion_ about concepts, any _theory_ built on that _notion_ will be wrong, too.
Don't worry. That she's wrong in her epistemology in no way detracts from the heroism of Galt, Dagny, Rearden, or D'Anconia.
And what does topology have to do with any of this? Concepts obviously include mathematical ideas such as "number", "function", "continuous", "discontinuous", "discrete", "complete", "closed", "open", etc., but they are not mathematical in nature themselves. "Units" are concepts, but "concepts" are not units.