Review and study of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Expanded 2nd edition (Kindle)
Text is: Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Expanded 2nd edition (Kindle)
Discussion Starts with Chap 2: Concept - Integration
Discussion Starts with Chap 2: Concept - Integration
Every X is Y
No Z is Y
Therefore, no Z is X]
* * * * * * * *
A thousand pardons!
I meant to write that the above was a valid syllogism in CAMESTRES (A, E, E):
(A) Every X is Y;
(E) No Z is Y;
(E) Therefore, no Z is X
So far, so good.
>You said: "prior to crawling inside the head of her imaginary infant, she asserted that language is necessary for the formation of concepts; then she admits that her infant lacks language. " That is also true.
So far, so good.
>You said: "So if it lacks language, then there are no processes that Miss Rand can observe" Where do you get that? ***Objects that do not possess language are observed all the time.***
Not in concept formation.
No language, no concept-formation.
No language > no concept-forming processes > nothing to observe (either by the infant itself or by an outside observer).
MAJOR: Every concept-forming process is made possible only by a knowledge of language.[asserted by Miss Rand]
MINOR: No infant has knowledge of language. [asserted by Miss Rand]
CONCLUSION: Therefore, No infant has a concept-forming process.
The conclusion follows ineluctably from Miss Rand's premises.
Since the infant does not have a concept-forming process in its head, Miss Rand cannot claim to observe one forming the concept of "length" without contradicting herself either in the MAJOR premise or the MINOR.
[The above was a valid syllogism in CELARENT — E, A, E — taking the form:
Every X is Y
No Z is Y
Therefore, no Z is X]
For a bunch of reasons, I cannot possibly find the time to participate properly in these, frequently flawed or misleading but very interesting arguments.
So, whet it it all said and one, I would be exttremely grateful for a document conatinind a complete collection of all the comments and replies. Just for my personla edification. Would you PLEASE make sure that I qualify as a recipient? Thank you!
You said: "She's describing how an infant forms the concept — the **CONCEPT** — of the attribute of length."
That is true.
You said: "prior to crawling inside the head of her imaginary infant, she asserted that language is necessary for the formation of concepts; then she admits that her infant lacks language. "
That is also true.
You said: "So if it lacks language, then there are no processes that Miss Rand can observe"
Where do you get that? Objects that do not possess language are observed all the time. The infant is a useful subject to study precisely because it does not yet possess language.
She is operating from a different set of assumptions than most of the philosophers in history here, presenting a fundamentally new idea in the history of philosophy, building her case brick by brick. In order to go from sensation to percept to concept there has to be a traceable sequence and a structure or method. You do not seem to want to let her make her case for some reason.
Assuming you actually do want to understand (though I'm not quite sure you do), I found an interesting article that does a better job than I can addressing exactly the issue you are objecting to:
The article is titled "Rationality and the Psychology of Abstraction" by Kenneth R. Livingston (http://www.atlassociety.org/sites/defaul...)
It is quite interesting because the Livingston begins by reciting a variety of theories psychologists use to try to understand how human beings use their minds to solve problems (i.e., behave in a rational manner). He makes the observation that all of these theories are inherently abstract, and yet none explain what is meant by the term "abstract" - they take it for granted. He proceeds to describe the only "noncircular empiricist theory of abstraction" there is - Rand's theory of concept formation. (Along the way he dryly points out that although most philosophers of mind cannot agree on anything else, they are unanimous on the point that a noncircular empericist theory of abstraction is impossible. Kind of like the position you are taking, EF.)
Here is the quote relevant to the point you are trying to make, EF (page 17):
- "The first stage in the process of abstraction thus involves the ability to distinguish
the degrees of difference that separate at least a trio of objects along some common dimen-
sion of perceived variation. This actually alters awareness of objects that are grouped to-
gether as a result of the process. In other words, their integration into a cognitive unit
(their comparative similarity, as it were) arises out of their initial comparative differences
with other items in the visual field. Note that the similarity and difference that are dis-
cussed here are perceptual in nature, not conceptual. That is, one does not have to possess
an abstract concept of “similar” or “different” to get this procedure off the ground, and thus
there is no circularity of argument. Relative similarity and difference are specified in the
sensory array and thus reflect relationships among objects and events themselves. The
sensory surfaces of a human being (or any other animal) have evolved to detect these
relationships by themselves responding similarly or differently to two sensory events in a
way that tracks the actual similarities or differences in the world. The fact that we under-
stand this process by deploying the concepts of similar and different does not mean that
the process itself requires these concepts to operate."
Anyway, if you want to argue this specific point any further, I suggest we take it off this discussion board.
mjweb
It has been said that when writing was invented, old priests decried the loss of memorization skills. (We know that the Iliad and Odyssey were recited from memory. The Gilgamesh most likely was, also, as its oldest written form is a thousand years later than the first written commercial contracts. Contracts were too important to leave to memory.)
From the fast scribbling of Gothic letters like these you read now, to the steel nibs that replaced carefully carved goose quills, to the ballpoint pen, the typewriter and computer keyboard, and now the pads and pods, we can complain that each new advance comes at a cost, regardless of the fact that we all obviously benefit.
Here in the Gulch is a discussion of a Yaron Brook talk on Objectivism. He speaks without notes. He knows what he is going to say because his knowledge is integrated. Compare that to the typical lecture where some Big Name Writer reads to you what he wrote - though you could read it for yourself four to ten times faster - and with more life - than they will drone and moan it.
Sarcastic(s)? Of course...
Chapter 2: Concept Formation
"Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute (chronologically, this is not the first concept that a child would grasp; but it is the simplest one epistemologically) — for instance, the concept 'length.'"
Why should forming the concept of an *attribute of an entity* (such as "length") be epistemologically simpler than forming a concept of an entity — which, after all, is more fundamental than an attribute, since attributes don't exist apart from their entities? Miss Rand doesn't say. She merely asserts it.
Miss Rand goes on to explain what, in her opinion, an infant's mind is actually doing when it forms the concept of "length," but claims that its mind is performing all of this "unit measurement" unaided by language — since, in parentheses, she write, "he has, as yet, no knowledge of words".
An odd admission.
The infant has no knowledge of words, yet its mind is performing lots of Randian differentiation and integration in order to form the concept "length."
Yet in a previous paragraph, she writes that none of this can be done by a mind in the absence of language, since "Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts."
Miss Rand at first appears to say that concepts cannot be formed in the absence of language; then she invents an example of an infant forming the attribute-concept "length" through her surmised process of unit-measurement in the absence of language!
Sorry, but if the infant lacks language (as it surely does), by what means is it forming the attribute-concept "length"? With what mental tools?
Just as confused is Miss Rand's description of forming an entity-concept such as that of "table." She writes,
"The child's mind isolates two or more tables from other objects, by focusing on their distinctive characteristics: their shape. He observes that their shapes vary, but have one characteristic in common: a flat, level surface and support(s). He forms the concept 'table' by retaining that characteristic and omitting ALL particular measurements, not only the measurements of the shape, but of all the other characteristics of tables (many of which he is not aware of at the time)."
She contrasts this with adult's definition of "table":
"An adult definition of 'table' would be: a man-made object consisting of a flat, level surface and support(s), intended to support other, smaller objects."
The only difference between the infant's pre-linguistic concept of table and the adult's, is that the latter includes what Miss Rand calls a "utilitarian requirement" — that the flat surface with support(s) be *used*, or *function* in a certain way. Since Miss Rand has already invented an amazing example of infantile mental gymnastics in the pre-linguistic formation of an abstraction such as "length", why shouldn't that same infant, at the same time in its young life, be able to pre-linguistically form the utilitarian concept, "intended to support other, smaller objects."
She doesn't say. In fact, there's no particular reason why the physical attribute "length" should be simpler than the utilitarian attribute "intended to support other, smaller objects."
In any case, from a purely Aristotelian/Thomistic perspective, the Objectivist theory of concept formation, as described here by Miss Rand, is a very confused affair.
To begin with, we have to distinguish between rigorous, logical definitions of concepts, and the great majority of non-rigorous, *dictionary* definition of words. You might say that it's the difference between a criminal trial (where the standards are rigorous) and a civil one (where the standards are less rigorous).
Strictly speaking — that is, in Aristotelian/Thomistic terms — the only concepts that admit rigorous, logical definitions comprising a genus and a specific difference (i.e., a differentia) are mathematical concepts, geometrical shapes, and the definition of "man" as "the rational animal." That's it. All other *dictionary definitions* of words — such as "table", "dog", "star", "cloud", "electron", etc., are not true definitions via genus and differentia, but *descriptions*, in which we accept some attribute as a genus and something else as a differentia for convenience.
The reason is that the specific difference is some attribute that is apprehended — grasped — solely by the intellect, not the senses. We grasp the essential difference between "thee-sided figure" and "four-sided figure", but we do not intellectually grasp the essential difference between "table-ness" and some other entity (such as other pieces of furniture) because there is no essential difference: the difference is the functional, habitual one of: "typically (but not always) used by humans for putting smaller things on for the purpose of supporting them." That's a description based on experience, not a true "specific difference" apprehended solely by the intellect.
No she isn't. She's describing how an infant forms the concept — the **CONCEPT** — of the attribute of length. She's doing the "novelist thing": she's crawling inside of an imaginary infant's head and claiming to see all kinds of subjective processes at work. Unfortunately, she also contradicted herself: prior to crawling inside the head of her imaginary infant, she asserted that language is necessary for the formation of concepts; then she admits that her infant lacks language. So if it lacks language, then there are no processes that Miss Rand can observe; the only observable processes would have to be LINGUISTIC ONES.
So Miss Rand is just plain confused here.
But she writes her monograph on epistemology with such certainty and authority that others believe her.
You said:
- In any case, from a purely Aristotelian/Thomistic perspective, the Objectivist theory of concept formation, as described here by Miss Rand, is a very confused affair.
- To begin with, we have to distinguish between rigorous, logical definitions of concepts, and the great majority of non-rigorous, *dictionary* definition of words. You might say that it's the difference between a criminal trial (where the standards are rigorous) and a civil one (where the standards are less rigorous).
You continue to work on the straw man you have erected. So how, exactly are you going to prove YOUR definition is the logical one?
You say:
- Strictly speaking — that is, in Aristotelian/Thomistic terms — the only concepts that admit rigorous, logical definitions comprising a genus and a specific difference (i.e., a differentia) are mathematical concepts, geometrical shapes, and the definition of "man" as "the rational animal." That's it. All other *dictionary definitions* of words — such as "table", "dog", "star", "cloud", "electron", etc., are not true definitions via genus and differentia, but *descriptions*, in which we accept some attribute as a genus and something else as a differentia for convenience.
Ah, EF, so you are going to make an appeal to authority. I see. You want us to accept the Aristotelian/Thomist’s claim that the only concepts with “logical” definitions are mathematical concepts, geometrical shapes, and the definition of man. You want us to accept the idea that all other words are not true definitions but mere descriptions where genus and differentia are a mere convenience.
BUT THIS IS PRECISELY THE POINT RAND IS TRYING TO MAKE. If you like, EF, you are free to arrange your genus and differentia as a mere convenience. Rand is saying there is something to be learned by doing this in an objective fashion, based on evidence of the senses.
You say:
- The reason [definitions are a mere convenience] is that the specific difference is some attribute that is apprehended — grasped — solely by the intellect, not the senses.
No, EF. This is impossible. Consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. You have evidence of the senses, something out there which you perceive, and the intellect capable of apprehending it, something in here (your mind) which apprehends it – analyzes the context – and makes the integration. Both are present, or you contradict yourself.
You say:
- We grasp the essential difference between "thee-sided figure" and "four-sided figure", but we do not intellectually grasp the essential difference between "table-ness" and some other entity (such as other pieces of furniture) because there is no essential difference: the difference is the functional, habitual one of: "typically (but not always) used by humans for putting smaller things on for the purpose of supporting them." That's a description based on experience, not a true "specific difference" apprehended solely by the intellect.
No, EF: Again, a distinction between table-ness and other furniture-ness is based on evidence. It comes from man’s unique ability to selectively focus on some of the attributes (and not on others), depending on his purpose. It necessarily includes a consciousness focusing on reality in a specific way.
Listen to what you wrote, EF: You are saying there is no essential difference between a table and other kinds of furniture.
You deserve to eat dinner on a hat rack for a while for that one.
You said:
- Miss Rand goes on to explain what, in her opinion, an infant's mind is actually doing when it forms the concept of "length," but claims that its mind is performing all of this "unit measurement" unaided by language — since, in parentheses, she write, "he has, as yet, no knowledge of words".
- An odd admission.
I throw a flag on this play EF. She explicitly said she was describing how the child's’ mind works in the pre-conceptual stage. Think, EF: A squirrel has to judge whether one branch or another will get him where he wants to go. That is the same pre-conceptual phenomenon she is describing in the child. Both use evidence of the senses to make simple comparisons, within their field of vision, to decide which item to choose.
The child can enter the realm of conceptual awareness by giving the attribute a name. The squirrel cannot. But they are both doing the same thing.
Why are you so intent on undercutting this discussion?
Then you said:
- The infant has no knowledge of words, yet its mind is performing lots of Randian differentiation and integration in order to form the concept "length."
- Yet in a previous paragraph, she writes that none of this can be done by a mind in the absence of language, since "Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts."
No again. She is describing the behavior of a child, which is similar to the manner any simple creature is capable of. They can perceive spacial relationships without the use of concepts if they are within their field of view. YOU are the one extrapolating things that are not there.
You keep going with this:
- Miss Rand at first appears to say that concepts cannot be formed in the absence of language; then she invents an example of an infant forming the attribute-concept "length" through her surmised process of unit-measurement in the absence of language!
- Sorry, but if the infant lacks language (as it surely does), by what means is it forming the attribute-concept "length"? With what mental tools?
Your straw man does not hold, EF: She is describing the nature of perceptual awareness. When the child uses this experience to form the concept of length, something simpler animals cannot do, it is using its conceptual faculty. Rand’s idea is pretty simple here, you are exercising yourself in an attempt to undercut her.
Brownie Points for accurately quoting Ayn Rand. Alas, she is wrong. And so are you.
>You have evidence of the senses, something out there which you perceive, and the intellect capable of apprehending it, something in here (your mind) which apprehends it – analyzes the context – and makes the integration. Both are present, or you contradict yourself.
Nice! Unfortunately, gibberish.
No one has ever seen an actual circle, but we know many things about them, and they are real. Any circle you draw — whether with a compass or with a computer — will only approximate a circle. Any physical attempt to render a physical circle in some material medium will only result in an ellipse.
Circles are seen and grasped ONLY via intellect. Sensory evidence has precisely zero to do with it.
My claims are based solidly on the Aristotelian/Thomist systems, which drew a sharp distinction between the kind of certain knowledge grasped by an act of the intellect, and the kind of evidentiary knowledge gained by perception.
If you're uncertain as to the difference between the intellect and the senses, let me know. That difference has to be the starting point of any discussion on epistemology, including any critical evaluation of Objectivist epistemology.
And in case you were wondering, the distinction between the intellect and the senses is a truth grasped by the intellect introspectively, and has the logical status of an axiom: you can build arguments on top of the distinction, but you cannot use thoughts or percepts to establish it as true. It is introspectively *self-evident.* Not being able to distinguish an act of intellect from an act of perception is as dull as not being able to distinguish between seeing hearing.
>You say: - Strictly speaking — that is, in Aristotelian/Thomistic terms — the only concepts that admit rigorous, logical definitions comprising a genus and a specific difference (i.e., a differentia) are mathematical concepts, geometrical shapes, and the definition of "man" as "the rational animal." That's it. All other *dictionary definitions* of words — such as "table", "dog", "star", "cloud", "electron", etc., are not true definitions via genus and differentia, but *descriptions*, in which we accept some attribute as a genus and something else as a differentia for convenience.
Correct. That follows self-evidently from the original distinction between intellect and perception. We grasp via the intellect — not perception — that the area of a circle is pi*r^2. It might be a fun grammar-school field trip to take the class to the school parking-lot, draw a chalk circle on the asphalt, and use a planimeter to measure the area of the circle; but that isn't how the original truth that the area of ALL cirlces qua cirlces MUST NECESSARILY always be pi*r^2. THAT truth is not grasped because of observational evidence — in fact, no circle you physically draw or observe will actually be a circle, but will be, instead, some kind of ellipse; and no two physical measurements you make with any device will be exactly the same.
Same for mathematical truths. The truth that the real number ".9999999..." = "1" is not established by observation, or looking at the "weight of the evidence"; it's established beyond any doubt, and with complete certainty, by an act of the intellect alone.
>Ah, EF, so you are going to make an appeal to authority.
An appeal to authority would be, "X must be correct because Aristotle said so." I never asserted that.
>I see. You want us to accept the Aristotelian/Thomist’s claim that the only concepts with “logical” definitions are mathematical concepts, geometrical shapes, and the definition of man.
It is self-evident via introspection that truths grasped by an act of intellect are amenable to the kind of logical division into a genus / specific difference that knowledge gained through perception is not. Everyone can grasp the essence of "three-sided plane figure", but no one knows what the specific difference of "table" is. The most we can do with the latter is list a bunch of observations that we've made ("flat surface"; "a support, or supports"; "if more than one support, each is of equal height"; "flat surface is perpendicular to support or supports"; "intended to support smaller objects"; etc.) and choose a "specific difference" based on convenience.
>You want us to accept the idea that all other words are not true definitions but mere descriptions where genus and differentia are a mere convenience.
That's obviously true. Not even Ayn Rand could tell us what the essence — the specific difference — of "table" is.
>BUT THIS IS PRECISELY THE POINT RAND IS TRYING TO MAKE. If you like, EF, you are free to arrange your genus and differentia as a mere convenience. Rand is saying there is something to be learned by doing this in an objective fashion, based on evidence of the senses.
Gee, sounds as if you're making an argument from authority ("Ayn Rand said X, ergo, X must be true.")
Wrong.
The least objective element in epistemology is "the evidence of the senses". Guess what? What *I* see, from MY field of view, and from MY perspective, is going to differ from what *you* see, in YOUR field of view, and from YOUR perspective. And if we both discuss what we see, and agree to ignore certain details and emphasize others so that we can both form the same IDEA (note: idea, not observation) of some phenomenon or entity, then it is via the intellect that we are reaching something that we both believe has objectivity, not via the senses.
The evidence of the senses manifests itself in something called "personal, individual, subjective, experience." Period.
David Kelly wrote a 30 page analysis of Rand's theory of concepts. It can be found here:
http://www.atlassociety.org/sites/defaul...
It is a bit more technical, but it also provides a more detailed breakdown of the precise mental processes involved - a nice table on page 29.
I will collect the various threads and put them into a document I will either post or e-mail to the participants.