And I wish them the best of luck. It is inevitable, but I predict the last state to allow it, absent a U.S. Supreme Court decision as we just had, will be ... Utah. Despite the prevalence of it, it has become part of their state identity that they are anti-polygamy.

This isn't a consequence of the U.S.C. decision, but of the decision to let the state control it in a society which proclaims individual freedom to exist. On the plus side, confirming the notion you can't prohibit polygamy would mean a crumbling of the power of the "compounds" where it is a religious imperative but due to the legal state of it the arsemonkeys who run them wield tremendous control over the others.

Let the light of decriminalization in and the compounds will falter and eventually either open up or die - and without government raids for polygamy. Instead the raids will be for the abuse and other crimes which go unreported from fear.

Edit:

I'm reviewing the decision itself. So far, there is nothing in it that fails if you swap "polyamorous" in place of "same-sex".

For example the original:

"Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes en- acted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right."

Can become:

"Many who deem polyamorous marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes en- acted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, polyamorous couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as Mono-amorous couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right."

And the original:

"These considerations lead to the conclusion that the

right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty."

Can become:

"These considerations lead to the conclusion that the

right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment polyamorous couples may not be deprived of that right and that liberty." - though to this one I would add there can be, for some, a religious expression aspect as well.

The decision makes numerous references to "the right to marry" being a "fundamental right". In legal terms, a fundamental right is not one which can be granted by government - only protected. It exists w/o the infrastructure of a government or society.

Several times the court has in fact decided in this fashion when legislatures have tried to limit who can marry.

In his dissenting opinion Roberts makes a false claim in the beginning. He states that "For all those millennia, across all those civilizations, “marriage” referred to only one relationship: the union of a man and a woman." This is factually incorrect as several religions have indeed recognized - and some promoted - polygamous marriage.

He then proceeds to make the claim that the cases the majority reference all refer to the government needing a strong justification to limit the right to marry. Yet he does so by continually asserting these laws referred to a marriage "as traditionally defined". The latter part is irrelevant. For example: "These precedents say nothing at all about a right to make a State change its definition of marriage, which is the right petitioners actually seek here." He is correct in a sense. However, they also say nothing of a State possessing a right to define marriage at all.

Where he misses the mark is in noting that the precentary case are about overturning states' attempt to limit who can marry. Which is precisely what the decision he dissented from is about. The case before the court was about a state attempting to limit who can marry. There is no mechanical or functional difference between the two - the only difference is the limitation itself.

He also states:

"The truth is that today’s decision rests on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that “it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.” "

This is correct, and it is enough. It is consenting adults. Consenting adults doing what they wish together is an essence of liberty.

But here comes the Big Rub.

"Although the majority randomly inserts the adjective “two” in various places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core definition of mar- riage may be preserved while the man-woman element may not. Indeed, from the standpoint of history and tradi- tion, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in some cultures around the world. "

This puts the lie to his earlier assertion that marriage has always been between "a man and a woman". Now, technically, you could assert that even in a plural marriage each individual couple within the cluster is married thus preserving the "one man and one woman" meaning. But if that is the case, then he would have to recognize that states can not criminalize plural marriage because the fundamental unit is upheld.

But the big rub there is that he asserts the "leap" from opposite-sex to same-sex marriages is larger than that of allowing plural marriage.

He then continues:

"""

If “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices,” ante, at 13, why would there be any less dignity in the bond be- tween three people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to make the profound choice to marry? If a same-sex couple has the constitutional right to marry because their children would otherwise “suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser,” ante, at 15, why wouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three or more persons raising children? If not having the oppor- tunity to marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay and lesbian couples, why wouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” ante, at 22, serve to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous relationships?

"""

Now, he does waver in saying there may be other aspects to consider and claims he doesn't equate them in all aspects; though he states none have been raised. In that he is correct. He places a high value on the procreation aspect of m/f marriages. In that regard his objections to "redefining" marriage to include non-procreative relationships would necessarily fall away. Thus, in terms of consistency he would likely have to

assent to the states not being able to limit plural marriage.