The Bilateral Disgust Contest
Posted by TheRealBill 17 hours, 37 minutes ago to Politics
Every midterm model assumes low presidential approval benefits the opposition. What happens when the opposition is even less popular than the president?
The standard midterm narrative runs like this: the president is unpopular, therefore his party will lose seats, therefore the opposition will gain them. The first two steps have modest historical support, as discussed in the previous article in this series. The third step is treated as automatic. If voters are unhappy with the party in power, they vote for the other party.
But what if they are also unhappy with the other party? That question is not hypothetical. It describes the current political landscape with precision, and it exposes a gap in every forecasting model being used to predict the 2026 midterms.
Both Sides of the Ledger
Trump's approval rating sits at roughly 35 percent. The commentary class treats this as a flashing red light for Republicans. But the same CNN/SSRS poll that produced that number also found that only 28 percent of Americans hold a favorable view of the Democratic Party. The Republican Party is at 32 percent favorable, which is underwater by any standard but still four points higher than the opposition. The entity the electorate is expected to turn to as an alternative is viewed less favorably than the entity they are supposedly fleeing.
This is not a normal midterm environment. In previous cycles where a president's party lost significant seats, the opposition was viewed as a credible alternative. When Republicans lost 40 seats in 2018, the Democratic Party's net favorability was roughly even. Today it has shifted to net negative by nearly 30 points.
The Priority Gap
Favorability is abstract. CNN asked a more specific question: "Do Congressional Democrats have the right priorities?" Seventy-four percent said no. Only 25 percent said yes, and that 74 percent includes a majority of Democrats themselves. Fifty-five percent of Democratic voters said their own party's congressional leadership has the wrong priorities. CNN's own analysis noted that Democrats are more likely to say their own party has the wrong focus than Republicans are to say the same about Trump. Among independents, both Trump and congressional Democrats are viewed as equally off-topic, with about three-quarters saying each has the wrong priorities.
A party whose own voters say by a majority that it is focused on the wrong things faces a problem that no amount of presidential unpopularity can solve. You cannot convert dissatisfaction with the incumbent into votes for your candidates if your candidates are seen as working on things voters do not care about.
The Cohesion Asymmetry
The internal health of each coalition tells a starker story than the topline numbers. Only 19 percent of Republican-aligned adults say their party is mostly divided, compared to about one-third of Democrats, a 14-point cohesion gap in the GOP's favor. Seventy-six percent of Republicans view their own party favorably, compared to 63 percent of Democrats viewing theirs.
On internal fracture lines, the asymmetry holds across every dimension. On the Democratic side, 72 percent say the Israel divide is causing problems within the party, about two-thirds see problematic divides over priorities and ideology, and 58 percent see division on whether to cooperate with Trump. On the Republican side, every comparable number is 10 to 20 points lower. The GOP has divisions, but its coalition experiences them as less severe.
Sixty-seven percent of Democrats say the fight over whether to lean left or move center is causing problems. That is not a party that disagrees about tactics; it is a party without consensus on its own identity. When your voters cannot agree on what you stand for, winning elections requires the other side to be so toxic that your incoherence becomes irrelevant. At 35 percent approval, Trump is unpopular, but the question is whether he is unpopular enough to overcome the opposition's self-inflicted dysfunction.
The Double-Hater Trap
About one quarter of the public holds a negative view of both parties. These "double haters" currently prefer Democrats in the upcoming midterms by 31 points. On its face, this looks like a Democratic advantage, but look closer at the reasons.
Double haters dislike Democrats primarily for being do-nothing (22 percent), not standing up to Trump (11 percent), or being too liberal (10 percent). They dislike Republicans primarily for failing to stand up to Trump (14 percent), not caring about people (10 percent), and Trump himself (8 percent). The double haters prefer Democrats not because they like Democrats, but because their reasons for disliking Republicans are more visceral and personality-driven while their reasons for disliking Democrats are about passivity and incompetence. "Vote for us, we're useless but at least we're not them" does not generate turnout enthusiasm. These are the voters most likely to stay home or change their minds before November, and the 2016 and 2024 elections both demonstrated that double haters can break sharply toward Republicans when conditions shift.
Why the Models Break
The forecasting models used to predict midterm outcomes share a common structural assumption: low presidential approval translates into votes for the opposition because the opposition is there to catch the disaffected voters. None of these models contain a variable for opposition-party favorability, priority alignment, or internal cohesion. They treat the out-party as a passive receptacle for anti-incumbent sentiment.
When both parties are at historically low favorability simultaneously, this assumption fails because the mechanism the models depend on, voter migration to the alternative, is impaired by the alternative generating its own disaffection. Disaffected voters can vote for the opposition despite disliking it, stay home, or vote on non-partisan issues like pocketbook concerns. The models assume the first option dominates. The current data suggests the second and third may be far more significant than historical patterns predict.
The generic ballot currently shows Democrats ahead by about 6 points among registered voters. In a normal midterm with a president at 35 percent, historical patterns would suggest 8 to 12 points. The compressed margin may itself be evidence that Democratic unpopularity is suppressing what would otherwise be a larger structural advantage.
What This Means
The commentariat treats Trump's 35 percent as a referendum verdict. The data says it is half of a bilateral disgust contest, and the other half is receiving a fraction of the analytical attention. Until the forecasting models account for what happens when both sides are underwater simultaneously, their predictions will carry a systematic bias toward overestimating opposition gains because they are modeling a world where dissatisfied voters have somewhere appealing to go. In 2026, they may not. And that doesn't even involve looking at toss-up or battleground races.
The standard midterm narrative runs like this: the president is unpopular, therefore his party will lose seats, therefore the opposition will gain them. The first two steps have modest historical support, as discussed in the previous article in this series. The third step is treated as automatic. If voters are unhappy with the party in power, they vote for the other party.
But what if they are also unhappy with the other party? That question is not hypothetical. It describes the current political landscape with precision, and it exposes a gap in every forecasting model being used to predict the 2026 midterms.
Both Sides of the Ledger
Trump's approval rating sits at roughly 35 percent. The commentary class treats this as a flashing red light for Republicans. But the same CNN/SSRS poll that produced that number also found that only 28 percent of Americans hold a favorable view of the Democratic Party. The Republican Party is at 32 percent favorable, which is underwater by any standard but still four points higher than the opposition. The entity the electorate is expected to turn to as an alternative is viewed less favorably than the entity they are supposedly fleeing.
This is not a normal midterm environment. In previous cycles where a president's party lost significant seats, the opposition was viewed as a credible alternative. When Republicans lost 40 seats in 2018, the Democratic Party's net favorability was roughly even. Today it has shifted to net negative by nearly 30 points.
The Priority Gap
Favorability is abstract. CNN asked a more specific question: "Do Congressional Democrats have the right priorities?" Seventy-four percent said no. Only 25 percent said yes, and that 74 percent includes a majority of Democrats themselves. Fifty-five percent of Democratic voters said their own party's congressional leadership has the wrong priorities. CNN's own analysis noted that Democrats are more likely to say their own party has the wrong focus than Republicans are to say the same about Trump. Among independents, both Trump and congressional Democrats are viewed as equally off-topic, with about three-quarters saying each has the wrong priorities.
A party whose own voters say by a majority that it is focused on the wrong things faces a problem that no amount of presidential unpopularity can solve. You cannot convert dissatisfaction with the incumbent into votes for your candidates if your candidates are seen as working on things voters do not care about.
The Cohesion Asymmetry
The internal health of each coalition tells a starker story than the topline numbers. Only 19 percent of Republican-aligned adults say their party is mostly divided, compared to about one-third of Democrats, a 14-point cohesion gap in the GOP's favor. Seventy-six percent of Republicans view their own party favorably, compared to 63 percent of Democrats viewing theirs.
On internal fracture lines, the asymmetry holds across every dimension. On the Democratic side, 72 percent say the Israel divide is causing problems within the party, about two-thirds see problematic divides over priorities and ideology, and 58 percent see division on whether to cooperate with Trump. On the Republican side, every comparable number is 10 to 20 points lower. The GOP has divisions, but its coalition experiences them as less severe.
Sixty-seven percent of Democrats say the fight over whether to lean left or move center is causing problems. That is not a party that disagrees about tactics; it is a party without consensus on its own identity. When your voters cannot agree on what you stand for, winning elections requires the other side to be so toxic that your incoherence becomes irrelevant. At 35 percent approval, Trump is unpopular, but the question is whether he is unpopular enough to overcome the opposition's self-inflicted dysfunction.
The Double-Hater Trap
About one quarter of the public holds a negative view of both parties. These "double haters" currently prefer Democrats in the upcoming midterms by 31 points. On its face, this looks like a Democratic advantage, but look closer at the reasons.
Double haters dislike Democrats primarily for being do-nothing (22 percent), not standing up to Trump (11 percent), or being too liberal (10 percent). They dislike Republicans primarily for failing to stand up to Trump (14 percent), not caring about people (10 percent), and Trump himself (8 percent). The double haters prefer Democrats not because they like Democrats, but because their reasons for disliking Republicans are more visceral and personality-driven while their reasons for disliking Democrats are about passivity and incompetence. "Vote for us, we're useless but at least we're not them" does not generate turnout enthusiasm. These are the voters most likely to stay home or change their minds before November, and the 2016 and 2024 elections both demonstrated that double haters can break sharply toward Republicans when conditions shift.
Why the Models Break
The forecasting models used to predict midterm outcomes share a common structural assumption: low presidential approval translates into votes for the opposition because the opposition is there to catch the disaffected voters. None of these models contain a variable for opposition-party favorability, priority alignment, or internal cohesion. They treat the out-party as a passive receptacle for anti-incumbent sentiment.
When both parties are at historically low favorability simultaneously, this assumption fails because the mechanism the models depend on, voter migration to the alternative, is impaired by the alternative generating its own disaffection. Disaffected voters can vote for the opposition despite disliking it, stay home, or vote on non-partisan issues like pocketbook concerns. The models assume the first option dominates. The current data suggests the second and third may be far more significant than historical patterns predict.
The generic ballot currently shows Democrats ahead by about 6 points among registered voters. In a normal midterm with a president at 35 percent, historical patterns would suggest 8 to 12 points. The compressed margin may itself be evidence that Democratic unpopularity is suppressing what would otherwise be a larger structural advantage.
What This Means
The commentariat treats Trump's 35 percent as a referendum verdict. The data says it is half of a bilateral disgust contest, and the other half is receiving a fraction of the analytical attention. Until the forecasting models account for what happens when both sides are underwater simultaneously, their predictions will carry a systematic bias toward overestimating opposition gains because they are modeling a world where dissatisfied voters have somewhere appealing to go. In 2026, they may not. And that doesn't even involve looking at toss-up or battleground races.
The article above examines national favorability numbers for both parties. But midterm elections are not national events. They are 435 separate House races and 35 Senate contests, and the bilateral disgust dynamic plays out very differently depending on whether a seat is competitive or safe.
Ballotpedia currently tracks about 43 House districts as battlegrounds, roughly 10 percent of the chamber. Democrats hold 23 of those seats, Republicans hold 20. The remaining 392 seats are solidly held by one party or the other, meaning the incumbent or their party's nominee will win regardless of what national favorability numbers say. In those seats, the bilateral disgust is politically inert; a Republican at 32 percent national favorability wins a solid-red district just as easily as a Democrat at 28 percent wins a solid-blue one.
The House majority turns on what happens in those 43 districts. Republicans currently hold a 220-212 majority with three vacancies. Democrats need a net gain of three seats. Republicans can lose at most two. The margin is so thin that the national topline is almost meaningless; what matters is whether individual incumbents in individual districts have done enough to insulate themselves from the headwinds affecting their party.
The Senate map tells a similar story with its own structural wrinkle. Of the 35 seats up for election (33 regular plus special elections in Florida and Ohio), analysts are tracking roughly 9-12 as competitive. The rest are safe. Democrats need a net gain of four seats to take the majority, a tall order under any conditions. Their best offensive targets are Maine (Susan Collins), North Carolina (open seat), and possibly Ohio (special election). But they are simultaneously defending Georgia (Jon Ossoff) and Michigan (open seat after Gary Peters retired), both in states Trump carried in 2024.
This is where the bilateral disgust asymmetry from the article has concrete consequences. In the competitive Senate races, Democrats need to persuade voters who dislike both parties to show up and choose the Democratic candidate. But those voters, as the CNN data shows, dislike Democrats primarily for being passive and unfocused. That complaint becomes harder to overcome when the specific Democratic candidate has to explain what the party stands for while 67 percent of the party's own voters say there is no consensus on that question. Republican candidates in competitive races face their own liabilities, but their party's higher internal cohesion gives them a more stable base to build from.
The commentary that treats Trump's 35 percent approval as a uniform national headwind for Republicans is conflating a national number with 435 distinct local races. In the roughly 390 safe seats, approval doesn't matter because the outcome is predetermined. In the roughly 43 competitive House seats and 9-12 competitive Senate races where it theoretically could matter, the bilateral disgust dynamic means the expected Democratic advantage from presidential unpopularity is partially offset by the opposition's own unfavorability, priority misalignment, and internal division. The midterms will be decided in those few dozen races by factors that no national poll measures: candidate quality, local issue salience, ground-game execution, and whether each party can give voters in those specific districts a reason to choose them rather than merely a reason to reject the other side.
Now, care to guess what kind of polling isn't being done, or at least isn't being talked about?
We're supposed to stay rational over feelings here in the Gulch, but I have this nagging feeling there's more to the fact that the electorate is so evenly divided between the two parties. As in why so close to 50/50 and not say 60/40 or even 70/30? Individual issues, like illegal immigration, can have splits of 80/20 yet the party votes are still nearly 50/50.
On more local levels....Notice how everything is backwards now? Homelessness is taking over the nation. Every quarter mile or so on busy roads there's somebody waving their arms around having an argument with the air. We don't remove the worst criminals from society, but eagerly push them back out to make more victims. Rather than kill Obamacare, we just hamstrung it, kept the corporate interests in it and recently saddled the working American with the biggest increase in premiums in the history of the western hemisphere. Absolutely nothing is going right in public/government education. After Musk uncovers unprecedented theft of tax revenues he's fired and nobody goes to jail. At this point...I'm shocked that Swalwell was attacked for raping those drunk female coworkers...political expediency I guess...
And, here I sit. Sending checks to the government that are close to my salary back when I stared my career.
I just watched a video about the degradation of South Africa in the past 15 years. Atlas Shrugged on steroids. Although White people are outnumbered 10 to 1 they are still blamed for all the country's problems, not the socialist/communist government or the tribal habits of the populace. The Zimbabwe example obviously didn't take. I'm watching NYC for an American version taking shape.