The Gas Price Mirage
Posted by TheRealBill 2 days, 14 hours ago to Politics
The pundit consensus that gas prices will decide the midterms rests on a snapshot treated as a constant, ignoring history, geography, inflation, and every tool available to the actors involved.
Gas prices are up. This is true, visible, and felt at the pump. Since the Iran war began on February 28, the national average has risen by roughly 35 cents per gallon. The political commentary has followed the price upward with a simple thesis: high gas prices are bad for the president's party, and this will hurt Republicans in November. The thesis is built on assumptions that do not survive contact with the data.
The Inflation Adjustment Nobody Makes
The most basic error in the gas-price commentary is comparing current prices to historical ones without adjusting for inflation. Cumulative CPI inflation from 2012 to 2026 is roughly 40-45 percent. Gas averaged $3.50-$3.80 nationally during 2012-2014, when Obama won reelection. In 2026 dollars, that range is approximately $5.00-$5.50. The mid-2022 spike under Biden, which peaked near $5.00, translates to roughly $5.50-$5.70 in today's dollars. Biden's party then lost only 9 House seats in the 2022 midterms, dramatically underperforming the predicted "red wave."
The current national average sits at about $3.38. In real terms, today's "crisis" gas price is substantially cheaper than what Americans tolerated during both the Obama and Biden administrations without it becoming a decisive electoral variable.
The Psychology of Spikes vs. Inflation
The 2021-2023 inflation wave became a dominant political issue because of duration, breadth, and acceleration happening simultaneously. Gas went up, but so did groceries, rent, cars, and insurance, and it persisted for 18-24 months with no visible policy response. The mechanism was not "gas is expensive" but "everything is more expensive, it keeps getting worse, and nobody can stop it."
A war-driven gas spike is psychologically different because it has an identifiable cause and an implicit endpoint. People compartmentalize attributable costs differently from systemic ones. To reproduce the "inflation is too damn high" political effect, the spike would need to persist six to eight months and bleed into other consumer prices in a way that makes it feel systemic. If gas goes to $4.50 but rent and groceries hold steady, voters treat it as a war cost, not an economic crisis.
The EIA projects crude prices falling below $80 per barrel by Q3 and settling near $70 by year-end. If that trajectory holds, gas prices will be falling through late summer and into fall. Voters process price trajectories more than price levels; a price dropping from $3.80 to $3.40 feels like improvement even if $3.40 is above the pre-war baseline.
The Geographic Mismatch
States with the highest baseline gas prices are overwhelmingly blue: California, Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Illinois, New York. These states have structurally high fuel costs because of state taxes, reformulated fuel requirements, and cap-and-trade programs. California routinely runs $1.50-$2.00 above the national average regardless of crude prices.
A war-driven crude spike hits every state in roughly equal absolute terms, but the marginal pain is experienced relative to baseline. A driver already paying $5.50 in Los Angeles who sees $6.10 is within the range of what they have normalized to. A driver paying $2.80 in Tulsa who sees $3.40 notices the change but is still paying less than Californians pay on a good day. The competitive House districts and Senate races are disproportionately in states where gas is structurally cheaper, meaning the national average overstates the political impact in the places where the midterms will actually be decided.
The Domestic Production Counter-Narrative
Political actors are not passive recipients of economic conditions. The Trump administration and its allies have a response available that converts this liability into an argument for a policy agenda they were already pursuing: "Gas prices spiked because we are still dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The Biden administration shut down pipelines, killed leases, and made us vulnerable. We are fixing that."
This narrative has a factual kernel that is difficult to attack. U.S. crude production hit record levels during Trump's first term. The Biden administration did restrict new leasing, cancel Keystone XL, and impose regulatory friction on domestic production. Whether those actions directly materially affected prices may be debatable, but the narrative is clean and intuitive.
It also puts Democrats in a structurally awkward position. If they attack the war by linking it to gas prices, they implicitly argue that energy prices are the paramount concern, which undermines their environmental regulatory agenda. If they argue for more domestic production, they concede the Republican frame. If they defend the restrictions, they are defending the thing Republicans blame for the vulnerability. If you read my post on Bilateral Disgust: this is one of the reasons Democrats are so split.
The MAGA coalition has already rehearsed this pattern with tariffs; "short-term pain for long-term gain" is a frame the base has internalized, and applying it to energy requires no new persuasion.
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve
The gas-price commentary consistently ignores that the executive branch can directly reduce pump prices without congressional approval, on a timeline calibrated to the electoral calendar. The SPR currently holds roughly 350-400 million barrels. Biden drew it down in 2022 for precisely this purpose and the mechanical effect was measurable. Trump has the same lever and less ideological resistance to pulling it; his coalition has no discomfort with the implicit endorsement of fossil fuel dependence that constrained Biden's use of it.
If prices remain elevated in September, a release of 30-50 million barrels drops crude $5-10 per barrel and gas 15-25 cents at the pump within two to four weeks, making the price trajectory downward heading into Election Day.
The Mirage
Stack the layers together: Current gas prices in inflation-adjusted terms are below what Americans tolerated in 2012-2014 and 2022. The psychology of a war-driven spike is different from generalized inflation and requires conditions the timeline probably cannot produce. The geographic distribution concentrates the worst pain in non-competitive states. The EIA projects falling prices through Q3 and Q4. The domestic production narrative converts the liability into an argument for the administration's energy agenda. And the SPR provides a lever the president can pull unilaterally with enough lead time to affect the October price trajectory.
Together, these factors suggest the "gas prices doom Republicans" thesis is a product of anchoring on the immediate spike and projecting it forward as a constant, which is the same analytical error this series has been examining in polling data. A number captured at a moment of disruption is treated as a permanent condition, stripped of context, historical comparison, geographic structure, and the agency of the actors involved. The gas-price mirage, like the polling mirage, looks solid from a distance. Up close, it is made of assumptions that do not hold.
Gas prices are up. This is true, visible, and felt at the pump. Since the Iran war began on February 28, the national average has risen by roughly 35 cents per gallon. The political commentary has followed the price upward with a simple thesis: high gas prices are bad for the president's party, and this will hurt Republicans in November. The thesis is built on assumptions that do not survive contact with the data.
The Inflation Adjustment Nobody Makes
The most basic error in the gas-price commentary is comparing current prices to historical ones without adjusting for inflation. Cumulative CPI inflation from 2012 to 2026 is roughly 40-45 percent. Gas averaged $3.50-$3.80 nationally during 2012-2014, when Obama won reelection. In 2026 dollars, that range is approximately $5.00-$5.50. The mid-2022 spike under Biden, which peaked near $5.00, translates to roughly $5.50-$5.70 in today's dollars. Biden's party then lost only 9 House seats in the 2022 midterms, dramatically underperforming the predicted "red wave."
The current national average sits at about $3.38. In real terms, today's "crisis" gas price is substantially cheaper than what Americans tolerated during both the Obama and Biden administrations without it becoming a decisive electoral variable.
The Psychology of Spikes vs. Inflation
The 2021-2023 inflation wave became a dominant political issue because of duration, breadth, and acceleration happening simultaneously. Gas went up, but so did groceries, rent, cars, and insurance, and it persisted for 18-24 months with no visible policy response. The mechanism was not "gas is expensive" but "everything is more expensive, it keeps getting worse, and nobody can stop it."
A war-driven gas spike is psychologically different because it has an identifiable cause and an implicit endpoint. People compartmentalize attributable costs differently from systemic ones. To reproduce the "inflation is too damn high" political effect, the spike would need to persist six to eight months and bleed into other consumer prices in a way that makes it feel systemic. If gas goes to $4.50 but rent and groceries hold steady, voters treat it as a war cost, not an economic crisis.
The EIA projects crude prices falling below $80 per barrel by Q3 and settling near $70 by year-end. If that trajectory holds, gas prices will be falling through late summer and into fall. Voters process price trajectories more than price levels; a price dropping from $3.80 to $3.40 feels like improvement even if $3.40 is above the pre-war baseline.
The Geographic Mismatch
States with the highest baseline gas prices are overwhelmingly blue: California, Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Illinois, New York. These states have structurally high fuel costs because of state taxes, reformulated fuel requirements, and cap-and-trade programs. California routinely runs $1.50-$2.00 above the national average regardless of crude prices.
A war-driven crude spike hits every state in roughly equal absolute terms, but the marginal pain is experienced relative to baseline. A driver already paying $5.50 in Los Angeles who sees $6.10 is within the range of what they have normalized to. A driver paying $2.80 in Tulsa who sees $3.40 notices the change but is still paying less than Californians pay on a good day. The competitive House districts and Senate races are disproportionately in states where gas is structurally cheaper, meaning the national average overstates the political impact in the places where the midterms will actually be decided.
The Domestic Production Counter-Narrative
Political actors are not passive recipients of economic conditions. The Trump administration and its allies have a response available that converts this liability into an argument for a policy agenda they were already pursuing: "Gas prices spiked because we are still dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The Biden administration shut down pipelines, killed leases, and made us vulnerable. We are fixing that."
This narrative has a factual kernel that is difficult to attack. U.S. crude production hit record levels during Trump's first term. The Biden administration did restrict new leasing, cancel Keystone XL, and impose regulatory friction on domestic production. Whether those actions directly materially affected prices may be debatable, but the narrative is clean and intuitive.
It also puts Democrats in a structurally awkward position. If they attack the war by linking it to gas prices, they implicitly argue that energy prices are the paramount concern, which undermines their environmental regulatory agenda. If they argue for more domestic production, they concede the Republican frame. If they defend the restrictions, they are defending the thing Republicans blame for the vulnerability. If you read my post on Bilateral Disgust: this is one of the reasons Democrats are so split.
The MAGA coalition has already rehearsed this pattern with tariffs; "short-term pain for long-term gain" is a frame the base has internalized, and applying it to energy requires no new persuasion.
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve
The gas-price commentary consistently ignores that the executive branch can directly reduce pump prices without congressional approval, on a timeline calibrated to the electoral calendar. The SPR currently holds roughly 350-400 million barrels. Biden drew it down in 2022 for precisely this purpose and the mechanical effect was measurable. Trump has the same lever and less ideological resistance to pulling it; his coalition has no discomfort with the implicit endorsement of fossil fuel dependence that constrained Biden's use of it.
If prices remain elevated in September, a release of 30-50 million barrels drops crude $5-10 per barrel and gas 15-25 cents at the pump within two to four weeks, making the price trajectory downward heading into Election Day.
The Mirage
Stack the layers together: Current gas prices in inflation-adjusted terms are below what Americans tolerated in 2012-2014 and 2022. The psychology of a war-driven spike is different from generalized inflation and requires conditions the timeline probably cannot produce. The geographic distribution concentrates the worst pain in non-competitive states. The EIA projects falling prices through Q3 and Q4. The domestic production narrative converts the liability into an argument for the administration's energy agenda. And the SPR provides a lever the president can pull unilaterally with enough lead time to affect the October price trajectory.
Together, these factors suggest the "gas prices doom Republicans" thesis is a product of anchoring on the immediate spike and projecting it forward as a constant, which is the same analytical error this series has been examining in polling data. A number captured at a moment of disruption is treated as a permanent condition, stripped of context, historical comparison, geographic structure, and the agency of the actors involved. The gas-price mirage, like the polling mirage, looks solid from a distance. Up close, it is made of assumptions that do not hold.
The standard framing you are pointing to became consensus in the press within about 72 hours of the 2022 election, and it has been repeated so many times since that the underlying data gets lost. Looking at what the data actually shows matters because the analytical error in the Dobbs-decided-everything narrative is the same kind of single-variable snapshot thinking the article above is critiquing about gas prices.
Some of the evidence that Dobbs mattered is real. KFF/AP VoteCast found that voters who cited the Supreme Court decision as their single most important factor broke more than 2-to-1 for Democratic candidates, and roughly 9 percent of Republicans who prioritized Dobbs crossed over to vote Democratic. Abortion ballot measures went 5-for-5 in favor of abortion rights across five states, including Kansas, Kentucky, and Montana where voters otherwise broke Republican on candidate races. Any serious analysis has to start by acknowledging those signals are real.
The question is whether they add up to the causal claim being made. A 2025 study in Economics Letters by Blumenkrantz et al. used nationwide county-level vote data and controlled for demographic and economic factors. Their finding: after those controls, the Republican vote margin in 2022 does not significantly differ from prior midterm elections. The one exception was meaningful but narrow: in states with abortion ballot measures on the ticket, Republican vote margin decreased by 4.8 percentage points more than the national average. Note that I use "market" often here. That is because I view politics through an economics sense - every race is a market for government power/use of force. I find it much more predictive and instructive to analyze them in that sense.
That 4.8 points has been treated as proof that Dobbs moved the midterms, but that reading overlooks a structural change Dobbs itself introduced: by returning abortion policy to the states, the ruling shifted the relevant market from Congress to state governments. The finding becomes less convincing still once you look at those ballot-measure states as the distinct markets they actually are rather than as six instances of a single phenomenon.
The six ballot-measure states came to their measures through very different political conditions, and those conditions pre-sorted the outcomes. California and Vermont had Democratic supermajority legislatures that placed protective measures, an option available only in states where Democrats already dominated. Michigan got its measure through a citizen petition requiring 750,000-plus signatures, the largest in state history and a demonstration of pre-existing organizing infrastructure that predated Dobbs. Kansas, Kentucky, and Montana had restrictive measures placed by Republican legislatures expecting to ratify conservative voter preferences. Every one of these conditions encoded political realities that existed before June 2022, meaning the states that entered the ballot-measure market were pre-sorted in ways the statistical controls cannot capture.
California passed Prop 1 with 66.9 percent in a state where Newsom won reelection by eighteen points. Vermont passed Proposal 5 with 76.8 percent in a state where the Republican Senate candidate lost by thirty-nine points. These states contribute to the 4.8-point finding, but their candidate-race outcomes were foregone conclusions regardless of whether abortion was on the ballot.
Michigan is the only competitive market in the set, and its congressional results are instructive. The delegation went from 7-7 to 7-6 Democratic, but Michigan also lost a seat in reapportionment and ran on entirely new maps drawn by an independent redistricting commission, making any Dobbs-specific attribution difficult to isolate from redistricting effects. The one district Democrats flipped, MI-3, followed the same candidate-quality pattern visible nationally: moderate Republican Peter Meijer, who voted to impeach Trump, was primaried by Trump-endorsed John Gibbs, who then lost to Democrat Hillary Scholten by 13 points. That is the Oz/Walker/Masters dynamic, not a Dobbs dynamic. Because Dobbs shifted the issue to state governments, the governor's race is where its effect should be strongest, yet Whitmer's margin improved only 1.1 points over her 2018 open-seat race despite $38 million in Prop 3 campaign spending and massive volunteer mobilization on the same ballot. That result is less than the typical incumbent advantage provides.
The Kansas cases are the cleanest test. In August 2022, Kansas rejected the restrictive amendment 59-41 with turnout roughly doubling typical primary levels. Then in November, the same electorate reelected Republican Senator Jerry Moran by a wide margin, sent an all-Republican House delegation to Washington, and split the governor's race narrowly for the Democratic incumbent. Kentucky and Montana show the same pattern: voters rejected restrictive measures while simultaneously reelecting Republican federal delegations. The ballot-measure market and the candidate-race market cleared at different prices in the same week, with the same consumers making different decisions in each. A referendum vote on a single policy question is a different product than a candidate vote bundling dozens of positions, personal qualities, and local dynamics, and voters evaluate them accordingly.
In the competitive-race market where the 2022 outcome was actually determined, the dominant variable was candidate quality rather than any issue dynamic. The Republicans who underperformed were Trump-endorsed candidates with their own liabilities: Oz in Pennsylvania, Walker in Georgia, Masters in Arizona, Bolduc in New Hampshire, Lake in Arizona. All ran meaningfully behind other Republicans on the same ballot. Meanwhile, pro-life Republicans with disciplined campaigns (and in the appropriate state market) won their races.
DeSantis signed a 15-week abortion limit and won 53 percent of women in Florida. Kemp in Georgia, Abbott in Texas, DeWine in Ohio, same pattern. The abortion attack worked as a delivery mechanism for candidate-quality attacks against weak candidates, not as an independent issue driving outcomes against strong ones. Tom Bonier of TargetSmart, a Democratic strategist with every incentive to claim Dobbs as decisive, described it precisely: Dobbs "focused and crystallized" the Republican extremism argument that "wasn't really making a dent in the numbers" before it had a concrete example to attach to.
A second factor often left out of the narrative is the failure of the traditional economic-backlash mechanism. Mutz and Mansfield, writing in PNAS, found that 55 percent of voters held "neither party" or "both parties" responsible for inflation. You cannot have a red wave driven by economic grievance when voters cannot decide who to blame, and that attribution failure was independent of Dobbs.
The structural problems in the Dobbs-decided-everything narrative are the specific ones my other recent posts have identified, with the added twist of comparing a previously national market to a new collection of state markets. "What War Polls Actually Measure" covers how national aggregate data cannot resolve local market dynamics. "The Number That Predicts Nothing" covers how a single metric gets assigned causal weight it cannot carry when other variables are doing the work. "The Bilateral Disgust Contest" covers how forecasting models fail when they omit load-bearing variables. The Dobbs narrative does all three simultaneously.
I laugh when I hear the left complaining about the gas prices. They were higher under Obama and Biden. Also, I remember that the left wanted high gas prices so the people wouldn't drive as much and take public transport and find alternatives (EVs).
Fake election results as an example of voters response to oil prices or anything else is not convincing to me. In a few mo.s gas at the pump will be significantly lower than today and won’t be a factor in the mid-terms, imo.